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NOTE
IS A 4-3 DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT THE "SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND"?
On November 15, 1972, in Roofing Wholesale Company v. Palm-
er,1 the Supreme Court of Arizona declined to be bound by the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Fuentes v. Shevin.2 The Arizona
court based its rejection of the Fuentes precedent on the ground that
Fuentes had not been decided by a majority of the entire United States
Supreme Court.3 Although the Arizona court attempted to support
its decision with case authority, it is apparent that the opinion turned
on the fact that only four Justices comprised the Fuentes majority.
4
The vote in Fuentes was 4-3. This split was the result of the fact
that the Court had opened its October 1971 term with only seven
Justices sitting. Justices Black and Harlan had retired during the 1971
recess and their successors, Justices Powell and Rehnquist, were not
seated until January 7, 1972. 5 During this period the Court considered
75 cases. A total of 12 cases, including Fuentes, were decided by a
four-member majority.6 Although 54 opinions were issued after Janu-
ary 7,7 Justices Powell and Rehnquist participated only in those
cases that were reargued after they had been seated.8
The Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Roofing Wholesale is im-
portant for two reasons. First, the Arizona court rejected an important
1. 502 P.2d 1327 (Ariz. 1972).
2. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
3. 502 P.2d at 1331.
4. See 502 P.2d at 1329, the court stating:
[W]ere we convinced that the four man majority of the United States Supreme
Court in Fuentes, supra, would become at least a five man majority when the two
judges who did not participate in the particular case are called upon to participate
in a similar question, we would then be inclined to follow the decision as set
down in Fuentes, supra.
5. Justices Powell and Rehnquist were nominated on October 27, 1971, confirmed
on December 6 and 10, 1971, respectively, and were seated on January 7, 1972. 404
U.S. at iv.
6. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405
U.S. 538 (1972); Fein v. Selective Serv. Sys., 405 U.S. 365 (1972); Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477 (1972); FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972); Reliance Elec.
Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971);
United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293 (1971).
7. See the tabulated summary of cases, 40 U.S.L.W. at 3293-96 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1971).
8. Three cases argued before January 7, 1972, were reargued before the full Court,
with Justices Powell and Rehnquist participating: United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S.
501 (1972) (argued 10/18/71, reargued 3/20/72); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972) (argued 12/6/71, reargued 2/28/72); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)
(argued 11/11/71, reargued 3/20-21/72).
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United States Supreme Court decision that has had a substantial
impact on the law in the area of procedural due process. 9 Secondly,
and of more importance for the focus of this note, the action of the
Arizona Supreme Court appears unsupportable by precedent or logic.
In fact, the court's decision strikes at the basis of the federal judicial
system by undermining the supremacy clause ° and eroding the con-
cept of stare decisis. In view of the United States Supreme Court's
past" and continued 12 issuance of minority decisions, the adoption of
the Arizona court's lead by other state supreme courts could seriously
affect the functioning of the judicial system at both state and federal
levels.
I. THE Roofing Wholesale CASE
Incident to an action on an express open account contract for the
direct payment of money, the petitioner, Roofing Wholesale Company,
requested the clerk of the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Ari-
zona, to issue a writ of attachment and writ of garnishment pursuant
to the relevant Arizona statutes.'3 When the clerk refused to take the
requested action the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel
the issuance of the writs of attachment and garnishment. The apparent
reason for the clerk's refusal to issue the requested writs was the de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin.'4 In
Fuentes the replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania were held
violative of the fourteenth amendment due process clause because
each allowed a person's chattels to be replevied without affording
prior personal notice and an opportunity to be heard.15
On the petition for the writ of mandamus the Arizona Supreme
9. Fuentes held that prejudgment replevin statutes that failed to provide for
meaningful prior notice and an opportunity to be heard were a deprivation of property
without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 80-93 (1972). The Court reached this result even though full title to the
goods remained in the seller, and the buyers had signed sales contracts permitting the
seller to repossess the merchandise upon buyer's default. The Court stated that the
buyers had sufficient possessory interests in the merchandise to invoke procedural due
process safeguards. Id. at 86-87.
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, which provides in part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
11. See note 81 and accompanying text infra.
12. See note 6 supra, listing the twelve minority decisions of the October 1971 term.
13. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1521, 12-1522, 12-1571 (1956).
14. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
15. See note 9 supra.
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Court declined to be bound by the 4-3 decision in Fuentes, because
"we are reluctant to declare unconstitutional Arizona statutes based
upon a decision by less than a clear majority" of the United States
Supreme Court.16 Additionally, the Arizona court did not believe
that it is unreasonable to ask that before we are required to declare
unconstitutional statutes enacted by our legislature with the result-
ing chaos to an important part of our commercial and contract law,
that the United States Supreme Court speak with at least a majority
voice on the subject.1 7
The Roofing Wholesale court attempted to support its holding
with several case authorities; however, examination of the cited cases
reveals that the purported authorities furnish tenuous support, at best,
for the court's decision. The first authority, United States v. Pink,",
involved (in part) the precedential value of a decision by an equally
divided Court. In Pink the respondent sought to have the writ of
certiorari from the Supreme Court dismissed as improvidently granted,
since the same issues had been decided in a previous case. 19 The Court,
speaking through Justice Douglas, held that the previous case was
not determinative of the issues because it had been decided by an
equally divided Court. Such a decision has no precedential value for
other cases, despite the fact that it is an adjudication on the merits
for the parties involved.2 0 The second authority, Frischer & Co. v.
Bakelite Corp.,21 concerned an attack on a decision of the United
States Tariff Commission, an administrative body with no judicial
authority.2 2 In Frischer & Co., the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals held that a quorum of a body may act for the body, and a de-
cision for the body may be rendered by a simple majority of the
quorum. In dicta, however, the court appeared to recognize an excep-
tion to this rule in the case of courts: "[A] clear majority of all the
legally constituted members thereof shall concur or no valid judg-
ment may be entered except such as may follow no decision." 23 In
the third authority, FTC v. Flotill Products, 4 Justice Brennan
examined the support for the contention, made in the Frischer & Co.
16. 502 P.2d at 1329-30.
17. Id. at 1331.
18. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
19. United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 309 U.S. 624 (1940).
20. 315 U.S. at 216.
21. 39 F.2d 247 (C.C.P.A. 1930).
22. Id. at 254.
23. Id. at 255.
24. 389 U.S. 179, 184 (1967).
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case, that courts are excepted from the concept that a quorum may
act for a body and that a simple majority of the quorum may make
determinative decisions for the body. He concluded that only one of
the nine authorities cited to support this exception was on point.
That case was an 1846 decision 5 which cited no authority for holding:
"[T]he concurrence of a majority of the whole number [is] necessary
to the validity of [the court's] action.' ' 6 In other words, there seems
to be little or no support for the exception to the quorum rule as
offered by the customs and patent court. Lastly, the Arizona court cited
Cain v. Commonwealth 7 and State v. Reese.28 These two cases concern-
ed state criminal prosecutions for the exhibition and possession of
obscene material. The state courts involved, struggling with the United
States Supreme Court's opinions on obscenity, declined to apply hold-
ings of the Supreme Court subsequent to the case of Roth v. United
States.2 9 Both state courts held that the later cases urged by appellants
were not determinative of the issue before them because of the in-
ability of the Supreme Court Justices to agree on the reasoning of their
opinions, although a majority of the Court concurred in the result
of each case.30
In summary, it seems clear that the authorities relied upon by
the Arizona Supreme Court do not support the contention that a
decision of the United States Supreme Court is not binding upon the
states unless decided by a "clear majority" of the Court. The Pink
case is clearly not apposite because it concerns decisions by an equally
divided court. The Frischer & Co. case, a questionable decision by the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, seems too weak a precedent to
be determinative of United States Supreme Court procedure. This is
particularly apparent since the third authority, FTC v. Flotill Products,
is a statement by a Supreme Court Justice effectively neutralizing the
contentions made in the Frischer & Co. case. Finally, there is no doubt
that the Fuentes opinion clearly expresses the view of the prevailing
majority, since there are no concurring opinions that differ from the
"Opinion of the Court," as is common in obscenity cases.31
25. Johnson v. State ex rel. Brannon, I Ga. 271 (1846).
26. 389 U.S. at 184 n.7.
27. 437 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. 1969).
28. 222 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1969).
29. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
30. The authorities cited by the appellants in each case as establishing a more liberal
standard for obscenity than Roth are marked by various concurring and dissenting
opinions, leaving the opinion of the Court, in some cases, to be joined in by only
three Justices. See 222 So. 2d at 737 (concurring opinion).
31. Cf. 437 S.W.2d at 771; 222 So. 2d at 734.
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II. CIUTICISM OF Roofing Wholesale
The Arizona decision squarely presents the question whether a
decision of the United States Supreme Court should or must reflect
the opinion of a majority of the full Court. In order to answer the
question it is helpful to consider the history of the legislation and
rules that have governed the Court's operation. An examination of
that history and the actual practice of the Court in modem times
seems to refute the conclusion reached in Roofing Wholesale. The
sparse authority relied on by the Arizona court is virtually over-
whelmed by the support for the proposition that a decision reached by
a majority of the quorum is a binding precedent and the "supreme Law
of the Land" within the meaning of the Constitution.
A. History of the Supreme Court Quorum Rule
As the following table indicates, the quorum of the Supreme Court
has been a subject of congressional legislation on several occasions
since the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789.32
NUMBER
OF QUORUM
STATUTE DATE JUSTICES PRESCRIBED
1 Stat. 73 (1789) Sept. 24, 1789 6 4
2 Stat. 89 (1801) Feb. 13, 1801 5 no mention3
2 Stat. 421 (1807) Feb. 24, 1807 7 no mention3 4
4 Stat. 332 (1829) Jan. 21, 1829 no mention 35 4
5 Stat. 176 (1837) Mar. 3, 1837 9 5
12 Stat. 794 (1863) Mar. 3, 1863 10 6
14 Stat. 209 (1866) July 23, 1866 7 4
16 Stat. 44 (1869) Apr. 10, 1869 9 6
36 Stat. 1152 (1911) Mar. 3, 1911 9 6
32. Table and notes 33-35 were derived from Note, The Problem of the Supreme
Court Quorum, 12 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 175 (1944).
33. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 1, 2 Stat. 89. No mention is made of a quorum,
but attendance of the Court is specified as follows: "[I]f four of the said justices shall
not attend within ten days after the times thereby appointed for the commencement
of the said sessions respectively, the said court shall be continued over till the next
stated session thereof."
34. Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 421. There is no provision for attendance
or a quorum, the Act simply stating: "[T]he supreme court of the United States shall
hereafter consist of a chief justice, and six associate justices, any law to [the] contrary
notwithstanding."
35. Act of January 21, 1829, ch. 12, § 2, 4 Stat. 332. "That if it shall happen, during
any term of the said Supreme Court, . . . less than the number of four shall assemble,
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The current statute, which has remained essentially the same since
the Judiciary Act of 1869,36 is contained in Title 28, United States
Code, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure: "The Supreme Court of
the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United States
and eight associate justices, any six of whom will constitute a quo-
rum."3 7 The current rule concerning the absence of a quorum is: "In
the absence of a quorum, on any day appointed for holding a session
of the court, the justices attending (or, if no justice is present, the
clerk or a deputy clerk) may adjourn the court until there is a
quorum."3 8
An examination of the quorum statutes indicates that, at least
until 1869, Congress followed the common law rule in setting a
quorum equal to a simple majority. The Judiciary Act of 1869, which
re-established a Court of nine, set the quorum at six, one more than
a simple majority. Why the quorum was changed is unclear because the
Act was apparently the result of various political forces at work during
the Reconstruction era.
One of the more significant factors affecting the passage of the
1869 Act was the political maneuvering concerning the case of Ex parte
McCardle.3 McCardle had been arrested for violation of the Recon-
struction Acts in 1867 and was scheduled for trial before a military
tribunal. He sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal circuit
court, and, when relief was denied, appealed to the Supreme Court
pursuant to the federal habeas corpus statute.40 Oral arguments were
heard on March 2-4 and 9, 1869, but while the Court was deliberating
Congress, by the Act of March 27, 1868,41 repealed the portion of the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 that had allowed a direct appeal to the
United States Supreme Court. The Court adjourned on April 6, 1868,
continuing McCardle and other Reconstruction cases until the follow-
ing term.42
the judge or judges so assembling shall have authority to adjourn said court . .. un-
til a quorum shall attend."
36. Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44. "That the Supreme Court of the
United States shall hereafter consist of the Chief Justice of the United States and
eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum .
37. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
38. U.S. SUP. CT. R. 4 (3).
39. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867).
40. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. "From the final decision of any
judge, justice, or court, inferior to the circuit court, an appeal may be taken to the
circuit court . .. and from the judgment of said circuit court to the Supreme Court
of the United States ...."
41. Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44.
42. The Court acquiesced to the congressional mandate and on April 12, 1869,
dismissed the appeal by a unanimous vote, "[T]his court cannot proceed to pronounce
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The fear that the Court was inclined to hold all or part of the
Reconstruction Acts unconstitutional prompted Congress to take the
theretofore unprecedented step of removing from the Court appellate
jurisdiction over a case that already had been submitted and argued.43
What is significant to the instant inquiry, however, is that the removal
of appellate jurisdiction was not the only device contemplated by the
Congress to limit judicial review of the Reconstruction Acts. A bill
44
was introduced in the Senate in December 1867, which would have
reduced the quorum of the Supreme Court from six to five. At the
same time, the Court, in response to the Judiciary Act of 1866,45 was
in the process of reducing its membership from ten members, with
a quorum of six, to seven members with a quorum of four. Thus the
bill, if passed, would have required five Justices, one more than a
simple majority, to conduct business. This bill was amended in the
House Judiciary Committee to provide that no act of Congress could
be held invalid without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all
the members of the Court. An additional House amendment that
would have required Supreme Court unanimity in order to invalidate
congressional legislation failed. The House then returned the amended
bill to the Senate Judiciary Committee where it languished while an-
other bill, defining the Reconstruction Acts as political in nature, was
introduced in the Senate. 48 Apparently the bill was intended to render
the courts constitutionally incompetent to question the validity of the
Acts. However, the new Senate bill never came to fruition. Instead,
the House acted by attaching an amendment to Senate Bill 213, a bill
permitting the Supreme Court to review judgments under the internal
revenue laws.4 7 The House amendment precluded the Supreme Court
from hearing direct appeals of habeas corpus writs by removing habeas
corpus from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.4 8
When the third session of the 40th Congress convened in December
1868, the general feeling prevailed that the threat posed to the Recon-
judgment in this case, for it has no longer jurisdiction of the appeal ..... Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1869).
43. See C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RE-
CONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88 PART ONE 437-92 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes
Devise Vol. 6, 1971); Note, supra note 32, at 178-79.
44. S.163, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867).
45. Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209.
[N]o vacancy in the office of associate justice of the supreme court shall be filled
by appointment until the number of associate justices shall be reduced to six;
and thereafter the said supreme court shall consist of a chief justice of the United
States and six associate justices, any four of whom shall be a quorum ....
46. S.363, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867).
47. S.213, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867).
48. Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44 (passed over Presidential veto).
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struction Acts by the McCardle tempest had passed. The Court had
adjourned without rendering a decision in the McCardle case and was
not expected to challenge Congress the following term by contesting
the statute obliterating the Supreme Court's jurisdiction of habeas
corpus appeals.4 9 In an apparent gesture of solicitude, Congress passed
the Judiciary Act of 1869.50 This legislation increased the Court to
nine members, relieved the Justices of some of the burden of trial
work by creating the office of Circuit Judge and allowed any federal
judge who had held his commission for at least ten years to retire
with full salary at the age of seventy.5' The Act also established the
quorum for the new nine-man Court at six, one more than a simple
majority. The debate on the provision providing for a quorum of
six is so sparse5 2 that it does not facilitate inquiry into Congress' intent.
But, regardless of what Congress intended, the primary effect of this
portion of the Act, which endures to the present day, has been to
require that more Justices be involved in each case than might other-
wise be necessary at common law. At least two-thirds of the full Court
must hear every case. A majority of four is needed to carry a quorum
of six, whereas a majority of three, merely one-third of the Court,
could decide a case with the common law quorum of five.53 It is not clear
why Congress decided to set the quorum of the Supreme Court at six
rather than at the common law requirement of a simple majority. The
statutory history of the 1869 legislation does not indicate, however,
that Congress intended any other deviation from the common law
concept of quorum. Therefore, since the new statute did not place
any express limitations on that quorum's ability to act for the Court,
Congress must have intended that the common law rule-a majority
of the quorum may act for the Court-should apply. This interpretation
of the quorum portion of the Judiciary Act is in accord with the
familiar rule of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of
the common law are to be strictly construed.5 4 Thus it would seem
that the Arizona court's action is in conflict with the intent of Congress
in enacting the Judiciary Act of 1869.
49. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 43, at 487. See also note 42 supra.
50. Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44.
51. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 43, at 487-88.
52. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 216, 239, 341, 574-76 (1869). Three Senators
commented on the proposed quorum, two favoring the common law majority of five
and one dismissing its importance to the bill, six Justices usually being available to
participate in a given case.
53. See Note, supra note 32, at 180-81.
54. For a general explanation of this rule, see 50 Am. JUR. Statutes § 345 (1944)
and cases cited therein. The historical perspective and an excellent discussion of the
rule is contained in Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
320 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.2:312
If Congress had intended to change the common law rules govern-
ing the majority of the quorum's ability to act for the whole Court,
the Act would have expressly stated that intent, as was the case when
the quorum was changed from five to six. Moreover, attempts by
Congress to determine legislatively the precedential value of Supreme
Court opinions may well conflict with the separation of powers doctrine.
Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the United
States in the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. Therefore,
the most apposite authority on the precedential value of minority
decisions must come from the Court itself.
B. Rules Imposed by the Court Upon Itself
Although the size of the Court and its quorum to conduct business
had been the subject of legislation since 1789, it was not until 1834
that the Court formulated rules concerning its own decision-making
abilities. In the companion cases of Briscoe v. Commonwealth's Bank
and City of New York v. Miln,55 Chief Justice Marshall announced:
The practice of this court is, not (except in cases of absolute
necessity) to deliver any judgment in cases where constitutional ques-
tions are involved, unless four judges concur in opinion, thus making
the decision that of a majority of the whole court.56
These two cases involved, respectively, the establishment of a state
bank and the regulation of navigation by the State of New York-two
areas that Chief Justice Marshall had always considered within the
distinct province of the federal government. 57 At the time these cases
were before the Supreme Court, which was then composed of seven
Justices, only six members were sitting. Justice Johnson was too ill to
attend. As a result of Johnson's absence, the Court was equally divided.
A tie vote would have affirmed the state court decisions that had upheld
the legislation which Marshall found objectionable. Thus the rule
requiring four Justices' concurrence in constitutional cases, imposed
upon the Supreme Court by Marshall, effectively prevented considera-
tion of those two cases that year.
When Briscoe and Miln were presented for argument the following
term (1835), the Court once again was sitting with only six members.
55. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 118 (1834).
56. Id. at 122.
57. D. Loan, CHIEF JUSTICE 374-76 (1949). "At this term [1834] two cases were
argued which he thought might upset two of his cherished principles-the constitutional
bar against States issuing any kind of bills of credit and the exclusive right of Congress
to legislate on navigation .... " Id. at 374.
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These six Justices, however, were not the same six who had split evenly
on Briscoe and Miln during the previous term. Justice Wayne had
replaced Justice Johnson, whose illness had proved fatal; that same
year, Justice Duval retired, and it was his retirement that produced
the vacancy on the bench when the two cases were again presented.
These changes in Court membership forced Marshall to revise and
restate the rule that had successfully postponed consideration of the
two cases the previous term: "The court cannot know whether there
will be a full court during the term; but as the court is now composed,
the constitutional cases will not be taken up."58s In fact, the changes
in personnel put the Chief Justice on the losing end of a 4-2 split to
uphold the lower courts.5 Nonetheless, he persisted in his attempt to
thwart a decision in the cases. It could be suggested that Chief Justice
Marshall formulated this rule to vindicate his personal political be-
liefs; regardless of his motivations, however, it is sufficient to say that
Marshall's concept of federalism passed away with him on July 6,
1835.60 The Court's 1837 decisions in Briscoe6 1 and Miln,62 favorable
to the states, became the landmark of Chief Justice Taney's tenure.0 3
Marshall's rules, however, retained some vitality through the Civil
War, and were mentioned in The Legal Tender Cases.64 These cases
overruled Hepburn v. Griswold,65 a 4-3 decision invalidating the Legal
Tender Act of 1862-an act essential to the financing of the Civil War.6
Whatever vitality remained in the rules was dissipated after The Legal
Tender Cases, and the modem demise of Marshall's rules can be
illustrated by the incidence of minority decisions in the period from
1945 through 1971.
C. Supreme Court Minority Decisions
In the 26-year period from the October 1945 term through the
58. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 85 (1835).
59. D. LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE 374 (1949), stating: "For a time .. . the Chief Justice
was able to supply with his own ingenuity the place of his failing associates."
60. Id. at 375, 382.
61. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837).
62. City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
63. "The Taney Court granted to the states much more autonomy in commerce
... .The decisions rendered often acted as a moderating force, that is, a grant of
local police power, between the extreme nationalism of Marshall and Story and the
equally extreme sectionalism of the old Republican states' rights men." Gatell, Roger
B. Taney, in I THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, 642 (L.
Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969).
64. "We are not accustomed to hear ... [cases involving constitutional issues] in the
absence of a full court, if it can be avoided." 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 554 (1872).
65. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
66. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 43, at 677-87.
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October 1971 term, the Court has decided a total of 57 cases by
minority votes.6 7 Unless the opinion in the case was also a "plurality
opinion,"65s each minority decision has been announced as and styled
the "Opinion of the Court."6' 9 "Plurality" opinions that are also
minority decisions have been treated in the same manner as plurality
opinions decided by a full Court.70 In general, minority decisions are
caused by a vacancy or vacancies on the Court or by a Justice's excusing
himself from participation in a case.7 1 Ordinarily, the reporter of de-
cisions does not indicate the reason why a particular Justice excuses
himself from a case 7 2 nor do the Justices normally set forth the reasons
for their own non-participation in any particular case.7 3 With two
exceptions, long vacancies were not common in the 1945-70 period.
The first vacancy occurred in 1945, when the Court sat the entire
term with eight Justices74 because Justice Jackson was in Nuremberg,
Germany, involved in the post-World War II war crimes trials.7 5 The
second extended vacancy was caused by Justice Fortas' resignation on
May 14, 1969.76 His place on the bench was not filled until Justice
Blackmun was seated on June 9, 1970. 77 Hence, the Court sat the great-
er portion of the October 1969 term with only eight Justices. Shorter
vacancies occurred after the deaths of Chief Justice Stone 7 and Justice
67. For a summary of the cases by type, see note 81 infra.
68. When a majority of the Court reaches a particular decision, but there is no
unanimity of rationale for that decision, the opinion with which most concurring
Justices agree is a "plurality opinion."
69. Compare Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946) (4-3 decision), with Robert-
son v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946) (6-1 decision).
70. Compare Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), with United States v. Tilla-
mooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
71. In United States v. DuPont & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 608 (1957), and United States
v. DuPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956), the non-participation of three and two
Justices, respectively, resulted in a minority opinion. It was non-participation of Justices
which resulted in the 1948 legislation allowing transfer of cases to circuit courts of
appeal when a quorum of the Court could not be seated. See 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1970).
72. See, e.g., 353 U.S. at 608, 351 U.S. at 404.
73. While the Justices normally do not explain a disqualification, it is sometimes
necessary to explain a refusal to disqualify. See Memorandum of Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
409 U.S. 824 (1972), explaining his refusal to excuse himself from consideration of Laird
v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), and denying the motion that he do so.
74. 326 U.S. at iv.
75. Kurland, Enter the Burger Court: The Constitutional Business of the Supreme
Court, O.T. 1969, in 1970 Sup. CT. REV. 1-2.
76. 395 U.S. at iii.
77. 398 US. at iv.
78. Chief Justice Stone died April 22, 1946. 327 U.S. at iii. Chief Justice Vinson was
not seated until June 24, 1946. 329 U.S. at iii.
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Jackson.70 As noted, during the 1971 term extended vacancies befell
the Court prior to Justices Powell's and Rehnquist's confirmations. 0
Since the close of the World War, the Court's minority decisions
have occurred in virtually every area of the law and have had serious
effects on large classes of citizens.8' Minority decisions have sustained
the sentence of death on two occasions;82 resulted in the federal govern-
ment's accession to off-shore oil revenues, to the financial detriment of
the State of Texas; 83 announced new rules for "standing to sue"; 84
and, as previously mentioned, declared unconstitutional replevin
79. Justice Jackson died on October 8, 1954. 348 U.S. at iv. Justice Harlan was
not seated until March 28, 1955. Id.
80. See note 5 supra.
81. Administrative Law: New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392 (1970); United
States v. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234 (1946).
Antitrust and Patent Law: United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971);
United States v. DuPont & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961); United States v. DuPont & Co., 353
U.S. 586 (1957); United States v. DuPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Ford Motor Co.
v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S.
319 (1947).
Border and Treaty Law: Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970); United
States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
Civil Rights Law: Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
Constitutional Law: United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Central R.R. V.
Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Hutcheson
v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); Kenne-
cott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946).
Contract Law: United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 (1970).
Criminal Law: Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650 (1962); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952); Bihn v. United
States, 328 U.S. 633 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946); Davis v. United
States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
Immigration Law: United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950);
United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950).
Jones Act, F.E.L.A.: O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E.R.R., 338 U.S. 384 (1949); Hust v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, 328 U.S. 707 (1946).
Labor Law: H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); Railroad Trainmen v. Jack-
sonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
Statutory Construction: Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970); Zuber v. Allen,
396 U.S. 168 (1969); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); United States v. Ohio
Power Co., 353 U.S. 98 (1957); National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356
(1955); St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 347 U.S. 298 (1954); FPC v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954); Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S.
209 (1953); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines,
Inc., 345 U.S. 663 (1953); Central Bank v. United States, 345 U.S. 639 (1953); Brannan v.
Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 339
U.S. 142 (1950); Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
82. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952); Fisher v. United States, 328
U.S. 463 (1946).
83. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
84. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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statutes that failed to require notice and a hearing before repossession .
5
An examination and comparison of the Court's minority decisions in
constitutional cases reveals that Fuentes v. Shevin has had the most
significant effect on the largest group of people.86 The charge account
85. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
86. The six constitutional cases decided between 1945 and 1970 by minority vote
reached into many areas but did not produce significant changes in American society.
In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 579-80 (1946), the
Court affirmed the constitutionally rooted doctrine that a non-resident may not sue
a state in federal court without the consent of the state. In Beck v. Washington, 369
U.S. 541 (1962), the petitioner failed to carry the burden of showing that his grand
jury indictment and trial violated the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. The Court cited United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351
U.S. 454 (1956), in holding that the burden is on one who challenges state action to
show unconstitutional infringement of rights. This is the traditional allocation of the
burden where "suspect classes" or "fundamental rights" are not involved. Cf. United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The case of Hutcheson v.
United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962), resulted in the Court's affirming the misdemeanor
conviction of a witness before a congressional committee who refused to answer ques-
tions but declined to invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court rejected the argument that the petitioner could refuse to answer questions
because they allegedly were meant to prejudice his case pending in a state court. The
Court went on to hold that since no fifth amendment privilege had been claimed,
it would be pure conjecture to allow a "due process" claim when there had been no
showing that the state would take impermissible advantage of federally-secured rights
by using the petitioner's answers before the committee against him in a subsequent
state trial. Id. at 612. The voluntariness of a juvenile's confession was challenged in
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). The Court found that a confession which
did not meet a minimum procedural due process standard and was the result of compul-
sion by state officials would "treat [Gallegos] as if he had no constitutional rights." Id.
at 55. Applying the "totality of the circumstances" test, the Court reversed the petition-
er's conviction of first degree murder. In Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607
(1962), the appellant railroad attacked the state's taxation of its entire holding of rolling
stock, regardless of location, as repugnant to the commerce clause and the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The Court held that the
railroad had failed to sustain its burden of showing that the property had acquired a
tax situs in another jurisdiction, which would have placed Pennsylvania's action in
violation of the commerce clause by subjecting the same property to multiple taxation.
Id. at 612-13. Additionally, the Court rejected the railroad's argument that Pennsylvania
could not differentiate between railroads having tracks totally within the state and
those having some portion of their total trackage without the state. The Court applied
the "rational basis" standard and found that Pennsylvania's action was not violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 618. The "speech
or debate" clause of the Constitution, art. I, § 6, was the subject of litigation in United
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). In affirming the lower court's reversal of John-
son's conviction for violation of a conflict of interest statute, the Court held that the
"speech or debate" clause of the Constitution forecloses judicial inquiry both into
the motives of a congressman in making a particular speech and into the content of the
speech. Id. at 184-85.
The Court decided five constitutional cases by minority votes in the October 1971
term. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971), reversed a decision holding that a
section of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 424(a) (1970), which provided for a reduc-
tion in social security payments if the recipient was also receiving workmen's compen-
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and time sales contract have become an integral part of American
commercial life and are subject to regulation in almost every state, 7
The magnitude of the issue involved, however, cannot by itself
justify the court's refusal in Roofing Wholesale to abide by a United
States Supreme Court decision that the Court,88 as well as Congress,89
sation benefits, was violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 404 U.S.
at 84. In upholding the challenged section of the Social Security Act, the Court applied
the traditional "legitimate goal-rational classification to achieve the goal" standard.
In Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971), the appellant utilized the class action device
to challenge the Illinois bail statutes as violative of fourteenth amendment due process
and equal protection. In affirming dismissal of the complaint by the court below, the
Court indicated that the Illinois bail system provided a rational basis for the discrimina-
tion between those who post full bond and pay no administrative charge and those who
pay only 10% of the required bond and are subjected to a 1% retention charge.
Id. at 367-71. The petitioner in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), challenged his
conviction for armed robbery, and urged the Court to hold that in hearings concerning
the voluntariness of a confession, the applicable standard for determining voluntariness
was one of "beyond a reasonable doubt" as opposed to "the preponderance of the
evidence." Petitioner also urged that if the judge ruled adversely to him, he was
entitled to submit the voluntariness issue to the jury for a de novo determination. The
Court rejected both arguments, holding that the voluntariness hearing required by the
Court's decision in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), was intended solely to pre-
vent the use of coerced confessions in violation of due process of law and was not in-
tended to pass upon the confession's truth or falsity. As a result, a standard of pre-
ponderance of the evidence regarding voluntariness is not violative of the mandate of
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt
to support a conviction. Additionally, the Court held that the rule in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which the petitioner urged permitted him to raise the
question of voluntariness anew to the jury, did not change the rule that requires the
judge, not the jury, to determine the admissibility of evidence. 404 U.S. at 490. The
loyalty oath required of all public employees in Massachusetts was upheld in Cole v.
Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972). Following a remand of the original appeal, the
Court held that the clause under attack-"oppose the overthrow"- was not designed to
require any specific action in any actual or hypothetical situation, but to obtain a
commitment from public employees to follow constitutional processes. Id. at 683-84. In
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Court held that the prejudgment replevin
of chattels pursuant to a state statute that failed to provide for meaningful prior notice
and an opportunity to be heard was a deprivation of property without due process of
law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 80-93. See note 9 supra.
It seems apparent from the foregoing case summaries that the Fuentes decision is
the most significant of the constitutional cases decided by minority vote. The dissenting
Justices in Fuentes based their opinion on what they considered the improvident actions
of the majority in raising serious questions about the statutes governing secured trans-
actions in almost all the states. 407 U.S. at 97. The Court denied the petition for re-
hearing. 409 U.S. 902 (1972). Since they had not heard the case on the merits, Justices
Powell and Rehnquist followed the tradition of not participating in the consideration
of the petition. See id.; R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACnCE § 15.6 (4th
ed. 1969).
87. An excellent compilation of state replevin statutes is contained in Brief for Na-
tional Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n as Amicus Curiae, app. A, Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
88. See notes 97 & 98 and accompanying text infra.
89. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text supra.
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intended to be binding. Such an action flies in the face of the well-
established judicial doctrine, set out in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, that
recognizes "the importance, and even the necessity of uniformity of
decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within
the purview of the constitution." 90 Furthermore, the Court itself seems
to favor reargument of some cases before the full Court when the
issues considered are of particular significance.9' Therefore, the
Supreme Court's refusal to grant a rehearing in Fuentes9 2 must be taken
as a dispositive indication that the Supreme Court considered the issue
raised in that case resolved, despite its importance.
Of the 45 minority decisions in the 1945-70 period, only six cases
involved constitutional issues.9 3 In contrast, five of the twelve minority
decisions during the October 1971 term required constitutional inter-
pretation.9 4 The larger number of constitutional cases in 1971 can be
accounted for by the significant increase in the Court's case load
9 5
and by the holdover influence of the Warren Court, which was noted
for its propensity to liberally utilize constitutional interpretation. 8
Regardless of the cause of the increase, however, the total incidence
of minority decisions since 1945, and particularly during the first half
of the October 1971 term, clearly indicates that the Court has ignored
Marshall's rule of 1834 in both non-constitutional (an area in which
it never applied) and constitutional cases. Instead. the Supreme Court
has rendered several less-than-majority decisions when presented with
constitutional questions. Moreover, on those occasions when the Court
has announced a decision that has limited precedential value (for
example, when the vote in a case is equally divided), the Court's pro-
cedure has been to indicate that its decision in such a case is not a
precedent. 7 Thus it would seem that by not indicating any of its less-
90. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816).
91. Two of the three cases reargued after Justices Powell and Rehnquist were
seated involved significant issues of constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants.
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
Additionally, the "Abortion Cases" were originally argued on December 13, 1971 before
seven Justices but redocketed by the Court for reargument before the full bench. Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
92. 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
93. See note 81 supra.
94. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972);
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971); Richardson
v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
95. The Court had 1,460 cases on its docket in the 1945 term; 4,202 cases in the
1969 term. Kurland, supra note 75, at 2.
96. Id. at 5.
97. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942); Durant v. Essex Co., 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 110 (1868); cf. United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 309 U.S.
624 (1940).
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than-majority decisions to be of limited precedential value the Supreme
Court has manifested its belief that those decisions are the "supreme
Law of the Land." In other words, if the Supreme Court had intended
that less-than-majority decisions were to have limited precedential
value, the opinions in those cases would have so indicated. Recognition
by the Court of the precedential value of its own minority decisions 8 is
further evidence that the Supreme Court views less-than-majority de-
cisions as authoritative precedents. Several state courts, including those
of Arizona, have also accepted other minority decisions as binding
precedents. 9 In the final analysis, there appears to be no historical
precedent for Arizona's rejection of what would seem to be a binding
United States Supreme Court precedent.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973) (citing 4-3 decision in
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971)); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing 4-3 decision in Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962));
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617-18 (1972) (citing 4-3 decision in United
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966)); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507
(1972) (citing United States v. Johnson, supra); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972) (citing 4-3 decision in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 n.B (1972) (citing 4-3 decision in Cole v. Richardson, 405
U.S. 676 (1972)); Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 587 (1972) (citing Cole
v. Richardson, supra); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (citing Richardson v.
Belcher, supra); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 531 (1971) (citing 4-3 de-
cision in Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962)); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 501-02 (1969) (citing United States v. Johnson, supra); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13
(1967) (citing Gallegos v. Colorado, supra); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967) (citing 4-3 decision in Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania,
370 U.S. 607 (1962)); Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966) (citing United
States v. Johnson, supra); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741 (1966) (citing
Gallegos v. Colorado, supra); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (citing
Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, supra); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 390 n.17 (1964)
(citing Gallegos v. Colorado, supra); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 69 n.11
(1964) (citing 4-2 decision in Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962)); Griffin v.
School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (citing 4-3 decision in Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946)).
99. Minority United States Supreme Court cases were cited as precedents in the
following state court cases:
Etheredge v. Bradley, 502 P.2d 146, 149 n.5 (Alas. 1972); Brooks v. Small Claims Ct.,
504 P.2d 1249, 1253, 105 Cal. Rptr. 785, 789 (Cal. 1973); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v.
Ehmig, 277 So. 2d 137, 139 (La. 1973); Cox v. Hjelle, 207 N.W.2d 266, 270 (N.D. 1973);
Brown v. United States Nat'l Bank, 509 P.2d 442, 444 (Ore. 1973). [All citing Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (4-3 decision).]
State v. Spence, 506 P.2d 293, 297 (Wash. 1973). [Citing Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S.
676 (1972) (4-3 decision).]
People v. Lindsey, 103 Cal. Rptr. 755, 761 (Ct. App. 1972); State v. Harris, 276 So. 2d
845 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Miller, 195 N.W.2d 818 n.l (Minn. 1972);
Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190, 197-98 n.5 (Texas Ct. Crim. App. 1973); State v.
Braun, 509 P.2d 742, 745 (Wash. 1973). [All citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972)
(4-3 decision).]
Henry's Restaurants, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 106 Cal. Rptr. 867, 872 (Ct. App.
1973); Sturrup v. Mahan, 290 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Smith v. Louisiana
1974)
328 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.2:312
D. Policy Reasons Favoring the Acceptance of Minority Decisions
The factors favoring the acceptance of minority decisions as binding
precedents include principles deeply rooted within the judicial sys-
tem. The doctrine of stare decisis, which ensures stability and predict-
ability in the law,10 obviously is impaired when lower courts ignore
decisions of the Supreme Court simply because of the magnitude of
the majority. The situation in Arizona is a clear illustration of the
problem. In Western Coach Corp. v. Shreve' ° ' the federal district court
for Arizona applied Fuentes to the Arizona replevin statutes and found
those statutes unconstitutional. Therefore, the subsequent decision by
the Arizona Supreme Court in Roofing Wholesale makes the rights
of Arizona defendants dependent upon the forum in which they are
required to defend. This predicament is further compounded by the
fact that other states, including some of Arizona's neighbors, 0 2 have
followed the Fuentes precedent. If all lower courts were to accept the
Sweet Potato Adv. & Dev. Comm'n, 262 So. 2d 371, 376 (La. 1972); Bellamy v. Judges &
Justices, 342 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139 (App. Div. 1973). [All citing Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S.
357 (1971) (4-3 decision).]
Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474, 485-86 (Ill. 1972); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney
Gen., 280 N.E.2d 406, 417 (Mass. 1972); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Garces, 492
S.W.2d 723, 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). [All citing Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S.
78 (1971) (4-3 decision).]
State v. Galloway, 167 N.W.2d 89, 92 (Iowa 1969); State v. Panagoulis, 253 A.2d
877, 880 (Md. 1969). [Both citing United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966) (4-3
decision).]
State v. Dziggel, 492 P.2d 1227, 1229 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Crouch v. Justice of
Peace Court, 440 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968); Brooks v. State, 172 So. 2d 876,
884 n.18 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965); State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 623 (Me. 1972);
Bristow v. State, 219 A.2d 33, 35 (Md. 1966); Severson v. State, 188 N.W.2d 414, 415 (Minn.
1971). [All citing Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962) (4-3 decision).]
Haman v. County of Humboldt, 506 P.2d 993, 995-96, 106 Cal. Rptr. 617, 619-20 (1972);
Bogota v. Brewster Equip. Co., 200 A.2d 629, 639 (N.J. App. Div. 1964); In re McLean
Trucking Co., 189 S.E.2d 194, 204 (N.C. 1972); Commonwealth v. Western Maryland
Ry., 282 A.2d 268, 270 (Pa. 1971). [All citing Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S.
607 (1962) (4-3 decision).]
People v. Lara, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967); S**** v. State, 299 A.2d 560,
576 n.1 (Me. 1973); Commonwealth v. Willman, 255 A.2d 534, 536 (Pa. 1969). [All citing
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (4-3 decision).]
State Tax Comm'n v. Miami Copper Co., 246 P.2d 871, 876 (Ariz. 1952); Hall v.
University of Nevada, 102 Cal. Rptr. 67, 70 (Ct. App. 1972); Yoerg v. Iowa Dairy
Indus. Comm'n, 60 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Iowa 1953); Kleban v. Morris, 247 S.W.2d 832,
839 (Mo. 1952). [All citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573
(1946) (4-3 decision).]
100. See, e.g., Catlett, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the
Extent to Which It Should Be Applied, 21 WASH. L. REv. 158, 159-62 (1946); von
Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. REV. 409, 410, 414 (1924).
101. 344 F. Supp. 1136 (D. Ariz. 1972).
102. See, e.g., Brooks v. Small Claims Ct., 502 P.2d 1249, 1253, 105 Cal. Rptr. 785,
789 (1973).
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Roofing Wholesale rationale then every minority decision by the Su-
preme Court could result in varying acceptance of such a decision
among the different jurisdictions. Minority decisions would place the
legal issues involved in a state of limbo, and, since the Court grants
petitions for rehearing in only extraordinary circumstances, 0 3 it could
be a significant period of time before the same issues would again be
presented to the full Court for resolution. The interim period would
be one of instability and uncertainty, exactly the situation the doctrine
of stare decisis is intended to ameliorate. Such a state of affairs runs
against the grain of a national judicial policy intended to promote
"uniformity of decisions."'1 4 Furthermore, if minority decisions bind
lower courts only when those courts choose to be bound, the Supreme
Court's consideration of cases like Fuentes has been a waste of judicial
time and effort. Certainly, the Supreme Court neither sanctions nor
encourages the squandering of its own decision-making efforts; there-
fore, it is difficult to understand why the Arizona Supreme Court is
ready to do so.
The optional acceptance of minority Supreme Court decisions
would also encourage "forum shopping," an evil condemned and
curtailed by the Supreme Court in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins' °5 and
Hanna v. Plumer.06 Litigants dissatisfied with a minority Supreme
Court decision may well be induced to seek a forum that they believe
would reject the objectionable decision. Thus a plaintiff could deprive
a defendant of his constitutional rights by choosing a forum that
rejects a minority Supreme Court decision. 0 7 To permit litigants to
speculate on the varying precedential weight that lower courts will
attach to minority Supreme Court opinions could have only a
deleterious effect on the stability of the law. 08 Yet, the Arizona court's
decision was in part prompted by reluctance to bring "chaos" to an
important area of commercial law. It is difficult to understand how
103. A motion for rehearing is normally only granted when one of the Justices who
heard the case originally expresses serious misgivings about his position on the merits.
See Ambler v. Whipple, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 278, 281-82 (1874); U.S. SUP. CT. R. 58(1).
104. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816).
105. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
106. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
107. For an excellent example of the evil of "forum shopping" see Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928),
a decision made possible by the rule in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Swift
was overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
108. The court expressed displeasure with the prospect of "chaos to an important
part of our commercial and contract law" that allegedly would result from declaring
the state statute unconstitutional. 502 P.2d at 1331. Additionally, the court did not
desire to "disrupt the business and legal practices of our community." 502 P.2d at 1331
(Hays, C.J., concurring).
1974]
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the Roofing Wholesale decision can be viewed as anything but dis-
ruptive, particularly since the Arizona commercial community was
already in the process of adapting to Fuentes as applied to the Arizona
replevin statutes by the federal court in Western Coach Corp. v.
Shreve.10 9 Moreover, if the full Supreme Court adheres to Fuentes in
later decisions, then the Arizona court's attempt to promote stability
in the commercial community will have been an exercise in futility.
The Roofing Wholesale case seems to hinge in large part on the
Arizona court's attempt to second guess the votes of the new Justices
who were to fill the vacancies that caused the 4-3 split in Fuentes. The
majority expressed doubt that "once the full court hears the case that
the opinion will stand." 1 0 The unsettling effects of engaging in a
"study of personalities"'1 " as a method of case decision should be avoid-
ed. Such speculation is particularly inappropriate where the nominee
has not been confirmed by the Senate. 12 Moreover, since it is possible
for different "interpreters" to take opposite positions on the Supreme
Court's disposition of a particular issue, the uneven application of
federal and constitutional law could generate significant disparities
on issues that should be treated uniformly. Permitting speculation
concerning the alleged predilections of the Court gives rise to the
inference that the Court is deciding constitutional cases by personal
preference or political philosophy, a factor that could seriously under-
mine public confidence in the judiciary. The mere appearance of
partiality, like the appearance of impropriety,' 13 should be avoided by
a member of the judiciary. The general rule, to which the Arizona
Supreme Court made itself an exception, is for lower courts to avoid
any speculation on how the Supreme Court would decide a case should
it be submitted for redetermination.1
4
Finally, the Roofing Wholesale rationale is inconsistent with the
principles embodied in the supremacy clause of the Constitution"
5
because, by rejecting Fuentes, the Arizona court has taken upon itself
authority to define the precedential value of a Supreme Court decision.
109. 344 F. Supp. 1136 (D. Ariz. 1972).
110. 502 P.2d at 1329-30.
111. Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 79 F. Supp. 62, 68 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
112. See note 5 supra. This is particularly true since two other nominees of Presi-
dent Nixon failed to be confirmed by the Senate.
113. There are numerous cases that urge judges to avoid the appearance of partiality
or bias as well as the exhibition of prejudice. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d
655, 657 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350
F.2d 806, 812 (3d Cir. 1965).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 281 F.2d 225, 230 (7th Cir. 1960); United
States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. I11. 1960), arid per curiam, 367 U.S.
909 (1961).
115. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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The supremacy clause and article III of the Constitution clearly pre-
clude such an assumption of power by a state court. There is specific
language in article VI which binds the judges of state courts to the
Constitution and laws made pursuant to it;"'a moreover, article III
vests "the judicial Power of the United States . . . in one supreme
Court." Put another way, the Arizona Supreme Court has "no right"
to question the decision of the United States Supreme Court when that
decision is rendered by a majority of the legally defined quorum."7
In an effort to ascertain the opinions of the judiciary in other
states with regard to 4-3 United States Supreme Court decisions, this
author conducted an informal survey of state supreme court
justices.," The survey indicated that there is little danger of the
Roofing Wholesale rationale gaining widespread acceptance among
the many state supreme courts. Over 82 percent of the justices respond-
ing to the questionnaire expressed disagreement with the Arizona
court's position. These state justices presumably share the same con-
cerns that the Arizona court had for the stability of local "contract
and commercial law"; 119 nevertheless, the great majority of the state
justices disagreed with the Arizona decision, which contravened the
supremacy clause and diminished the stature of a United States Su-
preme Court pronouncement on a constitutional issue.
Additionally, numerous justices of state supreme courts dispute
the contention that a state may decline to follow a United States Su-
preme Court decision, regardless of the reason put forth to justify the
action. In summary, it appears that the action of the Arizona Supreme
Court was without foundation in history or precedent.
III. THE ADVISABILITY OF FEDERAL ACTION To ENSURE THAT SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS REPRESENT THE VOTE OF THE MAJORITY OF THE
FULL COURT
The role of the Supreme Court in American jurisprudence is the
116. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby .
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
117. See 502 P.2d at 1331 (Lockwood, J., dissenting).
118. Questionnaires were sent to the justices of 49 state supreme courts, a total of
312 justices (Arizona excepted for obvious reasons). A total of 75 completed replies
were received, representing 24% of the incumbent justices from 31 states. Thirteen
states did not respond at all, and five states expressed a desire to state their views
on the subject when presented a traditional "case or controversy." The author wishes
to express his sincere appreciation to each of the state justices who participated in the
survey, and especially to those who made specific additional comments on the various
issues raised.
119. 502 P.2d at 1331.
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major consideration governing whether the Court should, as a matter
of policy, decline to consider a constitutional case when it is impossible
for a majority of the whole bench to agree on the decision. The de-
cision in any Supreme Court case clarifies and resolves issues of public
importance in addition to settling the dispute among the parties in-
volved. Acceptance of the Court's decision by the nation, however, is
in part contingent upon the public's confidence in the Court's credibili-
ty as an institution. It would seem that the decisions may well gain a
greater degree of public approbation if an opinion of the Court
represents the view of a majority of the Justices rather than of a
majority of the smallest number legally required to conduct business.
Moreover, as the apex of the judicial pyramid, it is important that
the Court foster and promote amiable relations between the federal
and state governments through its decisions. The Roofing Wholesale
case is an excellent illustration of the fact that minority decisions de-
claring a state statute unconstitutional do not generate support for
the Court's actions or promote amiable federal-state relations to the
same extent majority decisions might.120
The informal survey conducted by questionnaire of state supreme
court justices was primarily intended to elicit their opinions on various
proposed methods to eliminate or reduce minority decisions by the
Supreme Court. 121. Since a state court had rejected Fuentes, and since
the state courts of last resort must routinely apply the decisions of the
Supreme Court, the state justices' opinions were considered particular-
ly relevant to the general problem of minority decisions. A response
was received from approximately 25 percent of the 312 incumbent
state justices contacted. The responding justices represent 31 states.
12
Therefore, it would seem that a representative cross section of judicial
thinking was obtained.
One question presented to the state justices was whether Marshall's
rule of 1834123 should be adhered to by the present Court. This rule
120. The Congress, recognizing the strain in federal-state relations that might occur
when a state law is invalidated by a federal court, requires a three-judge panel to
convene before enjoining enforcement of a state statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
121. Another objective was to determine the reaction of the state justices to the
rejection of Fuentes.
122. See note 118 supra.
123. The rule was announced in the companion cases of Briscoe v. Commonwealth's
Bank and City of New York v. Miln, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 118 (1834). No attempt is made
to advocate the utilization of Marshall's 1835 rule, requiring a full Court to hear consti-
tutional cases. See notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra. The resulting delay could
cause serious problems for a Court which may already have too heavy a caseload. See
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1972).
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required the Court to defer decisions in constitutional cases (except
in cases of urgent necessity) until a majority of the full Court could
concur in the opinion. The purely pragmatic consideration of the
Court's caseload may militate against the deferral of this type of case,
however, because constitutional cases comprise a significant portion
of the litigation before the Court. For example, the seven-man Court
in the first half of the October 1971 term considered 75 cases, 39 of
which raised constitutional issues.114 Moreover, the nomination and
confirmation of Justices recently has taken a significant amount of
time; 1 25 therefore, it seems questionable whether the Court should,
as a matter of policy, defer decision on half of its docket while awaiting
the seating of new members. Indeed, the Court may be abnegating its
role as arbiter and interpreter of the Constitution if it postpones de-
cisions on the most important aspect of its work for a substantial
period of time.126 On the other hand, if constitutional cases were de-
ferred the state courts would be assured that a majority of the full
Supreme Court had concurred in each decision when the constitution-
al cases were finally decided. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find
that 62 percent of the state justices preferred that the Court abstain
from decision in a constitutional case unless a majority vote would
be possible. Apparently, the state justices felt they would suffer no
hardship from the deferral of such cases. In response to the suggestion
that Marshall's rule be extended to every case considered by the
Supreme Court, 69 percent of the state justices disagreed, citing the
possible immobilization of the Court by unexpected vacancies. 21 In
the final analysis, however, it is possible that adherence to Marshall's
rule would result in a serious backlog in the Court's docket, whereas
the benefits such a procedure could secure are largely immeasurable
and intangible. In 25 years there have been 57 minority decisions, and
only one has been seriously challenged because of the magnitude of
the Court's vote. Thus it seems difficult to make a case for the ad-
visability of deferring decision on approximately half the Court's
124. See 40 U.S.L.W. 3293 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1971) for a summary of the cases decided
by the seven-man Court in the first half of the October 1971 term.
125. Three and one-half months elapsed from the time Justices Harlan and Black
retired until Justices Powell and Rehnquist were seated. See 404 U.S. at iv.
126. The thrust of the Freund proposal, to create a National Court of Appeals,
inferior to the Supreme Court, is to free the Court for the consideration of the most
significant cases. American Bar Association, Creation of New National Court of Appeals
is Proposed by Blue-Ribbon Study Group, 59 A.B.A.J. 139, 142 (1973).
127. The only relief would occur where the Court could not seat a quorum. In
that instance, the statute allowing transfer to the originating circuit for final adjudica-
tion would become effective. See 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1970).
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docket. The possibility of extended delay seems to outweigh whatever
benefits the rule might accomplish.
Rather than maintain an informal guide to decision-making, as
embodied in Marshall's rule of 1834, Congress could amend the
current quorum rule,128 or the Court could adopt a formal rule
2
specifying the minimum number of justices needed to concur in a
given decision. Many states have explicit constitutional or statutory
provisions requiring the concurrence of a specified number of supreme
court justices in order to decide a case. 30 Congress at one time did
consider imposing on the Supreme Court a unanimous voting re-
quirement in order to invalidate Congressional legislation, but that
requirement was proposed when fear was rampant that the Court
would invalidate the controversial Reconstruction Acts. More rational
reflection on legislation that attempts to place voting requirements on
the Supreme Court's ability to act certainly raises separation of powers
considerations. 131 Congress' ability to regulate Supreme Court pro-
cedure would seem to be limited to increasing or decreasing the
number of Justices on the bench and setting the quorum. There is
historical precedent for legislation in both of these areas. Of course,
by raising the quorum Congress could ensure that a majority of the
full Court would concur in each case. However, this type of legislation
could immobilize the Court. If the number of Justices remains at
nine, Congress would have to mandate a quorum of all the Justices
before it could be assured that five members would concur in every
decision. The disadvantages of a quorum requirement of nine are
obvious.
The Court itself would seem to be the best source of any changes
in its own decision-making procedures. In the past the Court has
prescribed voting rules for particular situations,'132 but, since The Legal
128. "The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice
of the United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a
quorum." 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
129. The Supreme Court may enact rules for the conduct of its business. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071 (1970).
130. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art VI, § 2; FLA. CONsrr. art. V, § 3; I.. CoNsr. art. VI,
§ 3; KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 2; LA. CONST. art. 7, § 4; NEV. CONsT. art. 6, § 2; N.Y. CONST.
art. VI, § 2; OKLA. CoNsr. art. VII, § 3; S.D. CONsT. art. V, § 7; TENN. CONsT. art. VI, § 2;
TEx. CONST. art. V, §2; UTAH CONsT. art. VIII, § 2; VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 2; WASH. CONsT.
art. IV, § 2; WYo. CONST. art. 5, § 5; ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 14 (Cum. Supp. 1971); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 22-206 (1962); ORE. REV. STAT. § 2.111 (1953).
131. See 86 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1812 (1973).
132. In disbarment proceedings, the concurrence of a majority of participating
Justices is required before a lawyer will be disbarred. U.S. Sup. Cr. R. 8. A case will not
be reheard unless a majority of the original participants concur in the motion. U.S.
Sup. CT. R. 58.
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Tender Cases were decided, the Court has not imposed upon itself a
general rule requiring concurrence of a minimum number in each
case. This omission must be construed as indicative of the Court's
satisfaction with the current quorum rule, which does not specify
that a minimum number of Justices concur. Furthermore, establish-
ing Marshall's rule by statute or by formal rule of practice would not
alleviate the real problems raised by the deferral of significant
numbers of cases. Such a rule could restrict the Court's freedom of
action in managing its docket, in direct contravention of the policy
underlying the Court's certiorari jurisdiction .1 3
By the overwhelming majority of 75 percent to 25 percent, the
state justices disapproved the idea of congressional action requiring a
minimum number of Justices to concur in each case. The state justices
also demonstrated only grudging approval of a minimum-concurrence
rule imposed upon itself by the Court, 53 percent to 47 percent. Many
state justices indicated that they would consider legislation requiring
concurrence of a certain number of Justices an interference with the
judicial process, and these justices often expressed dissatisfaction with
the applicable provisions in their own states.
On several occasions commentators have proposed that judges from
the circuit courts of appeals be seated on the Supreme Court in order
to provide a full bench in every case.1 3 4 Nevertheless, the language pre-
scribing the composition of the Court has remained unchanged since
the Judiciary Act of 1869,135 and support for the transfer of lower
court judges to the Supreme Court has never been sufficient to make
the proposition law. The current proposal for the revision of Title 28,
United States Code, judiciary and Judicial Procedure, contains no
provision for the temporary seating of other federal judges on the
Supreme Court in the case of vacancies.15 6 Notwithstanding the long
history of "one supreme Court," 56 percent of the state justices re-
sponding to the survey favored congressional legislation providing for
temporary seatings of judges from the circuit courts of appeals. Such
a result is apparently consistent with the state justices' preference for
deferral of constitutional cases until a majority vote of the full Court
is possible and with their predilection toward a rule of the Court
specifying a minimum number of Justices that must concur in a given
case. Additionally, many states have constitutional or statutory pro-
133. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254-58 (1970).
134. See, e.g., Carrington, The Supreme Court: The Problem of Minority Decisions,
44 A.B.A.J. 137, 140 (1958); Andrews, Decisions by Minority Court, 18 FLA. B.J. 238,
240 (1944); Note, supra note 32, at 187-88.
135. See pp. 316-20 supra.
136. S.1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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visions that provide for the temporary seating of lower court judges
or other qualified persons on the bench of the state's highest court." 7
Such provisions ensure that a full court consider any case and that
a majority vote is always possible. The state justices evidently approve
of these provisions. Moreover, there seem to be no formal barriers to
the implementation of such a replacement procedure at the Supreme
Court level because, in terms of appointment to office, there is no sta-
tutory distinction between Supreme Court Justices and other federal
judges. While differing factors may affect the selection and nomination
process, the appointment of each federal judge is consented to by the
Senate. 138 Therefore, ostensibly all federal judges are legally qualified
to serve on the Supreme Court.
The proposal to seat judges from the courts of appeals on the
Supreme Court, like any plan to alter the composition or procedures
of the Court, must be considered in light of the Court's unique place
in American society. In addition to assuring uniformity of federal law,
the Court defines and vindicates rights guaranteed by the Constitution
and ensures maintenance of the constitutional distribution of powers
within the federal union. Placing lower federal court judges on the
bench could hinder the Court's performance of its role by diluting the
respect accorded to the Justices because of their unique stature among
the judiciary. Furthermore, just as pragmatic considerations of case
load may make it impossible for the Court to defer constitutional
cases until a majority vote of the full Court is possible, it is also likely
that considerations of human logistics may make attempts to es-
tablish a plan to seat other federal judges on the Court equally im-
possible. Unfilled vacancies on the federal bench are a continuing
137. See, e.g., Asuz. CONsT. art. 6, § 3; CAL. CONsr. art. VI, § 6; COLO. CONST. art. VI,
§ 5; DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 12; FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 2; GA. CONST. art. 6, § 2-3702; HAWAII
CONST. art. 5, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 6; ILL. CONST. VI, § 16; Ky. CONST. § 117; LA.
CONST. art. 7, § 4; MD. CONST. art. 4, § 18A; Mo. CONsT. art. 5, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. 7,
§ 3; NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 4; N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. 4, § 8; N.D. CONST.
art. 4, § 100; OHIO CONST. art. 4, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. 10, §
5; S.C. CONST. art. V, § 6; TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 11; TEx. CONST. art. V, § 11; UTAH
CONST. art. VIII, § 2; W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 7; WYo. CONST. art. 5, § 4; ALA. CODE tit.
13, § 15 (Cum. Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-204 (1960); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 4, §§ 1, 6 (1964); MrcH. CoMP. LAWS § 168.404 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 2.724
(1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:3 (1968); ORE. REV. STAT. § 2.052 (1971); S.D. COM-
PILED LAWS ANN. § 16-1-5 (1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 17.19 (1972).
138. The Constitution specifically mentions that the appointment of Justices to
the Supreme Court shall be consented to by the Senate. U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 2. Pur-
suant to statute, the appointment of other federal judges occurs in a like manner. See
28 U.S.C. § 44 (1970) (circuit courts of appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1970) (district
courts); 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1970) (Court of Claims); 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1970) (Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1970) (Customs Court).
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problem.139 If each individual nominated for a seat on the circuit
court of appeals could someday sit on the Supreme Court, the con-
firmation process could be interminably delayed.14 0 The possibility
that a circuit court of appeals judge could sit on the Supreme Court
might induce Congress to insist on a more thorough and searching
examination of each nominee; it is possible that the nomination/
confirmation apparatus would then bog down of its own weight.
The desired standard of a full Court would necessitate a significant
amount of judicial transfer in order to deliberate a small number of
cases. Of the 57 cases decided by 4-3 votes in the Court's 1945 through
1971 terms, only 11 required constitutional interpretation.141 Of the
39 constitutional cases1 -42 considered by the seven-man Court in the
October 1971 forum, only five were decided by minority vote.14 3 Thus
in many cases circuit judges could be called up to fill vacancies on
the bench, but their votes would not be necessary to decide the case
by a majority. In other words, five regular Supreme Court Justices
could agree, and, therefore, the circuit judges' vote would be un-
necessary. The argument in favor of the present system posed by the
practical considerations of the Court docket and human logistics, how-
ever, probably would not convince the Roofing Wholesale court that
it is unfeasible to require a majority vote of the Justices in every
Supreme Court case. If the supremacy clause of the Constitution failed
to dissuade the Arizona Supreme Court from rejecting Fuentes, it
would seem that purely pragmatic reasons would be equally futile.
The most significant changes that would result from seating cir-
cuit judges on the Court probably would be unmeasurable. As a
collegial body, the Court's decisions are influenced by the interplay
of concepts and ideas in a confidential conference. It is likely that the
Justices establish a certain rapport among themselves, which facilitates
the conduct of the Court's work. The introduction of "strangers" into
the Court's internal proceedings could seriously disrupt the long-
term functioning of the Court, especially since the interruptions would
occur randomly and on a continuing basis. There would not be "one
supreme Court" 144 but an infinite number, varying with the random
absences of the Justices. Even if such occurrences are constitutionally
139. See Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch-1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125,
1126 (1973).
140. Over six weeks were consumed in the confirmation process for Justices Powell
and Rehnquist. See 404 U.S. at iv.
141. See notes 6 & 81 supra.
142. See note 124 supra.
143. See note 6 supra.
144. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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permissible,'145 the stability and predictability in the law embodied in
the doctrine of stare decisis would surely suffer. Moreover, the evils
of case analysis by speculation on the judges' personalities could be
compounded where one or more of the judges in a case is an "unknown
quantity." Even if a particular substitute Justice's judicial tempera-
ment could be accurately estimated from past opinions, the pressure
of being elevated to the nation's highest tribunal could affect pre-
viously developed attitudes. In summary, a practice of seating lower
federal court judges on the Supreme Court for temporary service
might raise more difficulties than it would resolve.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rejection of a minority decision of the United States Supreme
Court by one state has raised the question of whether the Court or
Congress should act to ensure that a majority of the full Court decides
each case presented to it. The Court's quorum has been regulated by
Congress since the Judiciary Act of 1789. Congress' latest pronounce-
ment 4 ' preserves an organization of the Court that is now over one
hundred years old.147 The Court is required to consider each case
with at least two-thirds (six) of the Justices sitting, one more than a
simple majority. Neither the Congress nor the Court has, in modem
times, imposed a restriction upon the decision-making ability of the
Court by requiring a minimum number of Justices to concur in a
given case.
It has often been suggested that federal judges or retired Justices
be seated on the Court when excusals or temporary vacancies occur,
to provide a full bench and to avoid minority decisions. Congress has
taken affirmative action to provide for disposition of a case when a
quorum cannot be obtained, but that solution involves transfer of
the case to a lower court, not the seating of other federal judges on
the Supreme Court. If implemented, proposals to elevate federal court
judges or to call upon former Supreme Court Justices would enable
the majority of a full Court to resolve any issue before it. But the
145. The concept of a "fluid" Supreme Court, where there is never a guarantee
that the same nine Justices will consider any two cases, seems inimical to the language
of article III. One commentator, objecting to the Freund report's recommendation of a
National Court of Appeals, interprets "one supreme Court" to mean one unit of nine
Justices. See Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253, 255
(1973). If that one unit has a changing cast of characters, it becomes not one, but
many, Supreme Courts. That the Court is attributed the personality of the Justices is
evident. See generally Kurland, supra note 75.
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
147. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 4 (2d cd. 1970).
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alleged benefits of stability in the law, and the policy favoring the na-
tion's highest Court speaking only with a majority voice, could be
eroded by the detrimental effect of allowing numerous individuals,
who only temporarily share the unique burden of the Court's role in
American jurisprudence, to participate in the Court's decisions. Addi-
tionally, the administrative problems of the nomination and appoint-
ment of federal judges would be greatly increased, as would the
logistical problem of ensuring that an adequate number of judges
would be prepared and available to sit on the Court as the need might
arise. In view of the federal judiciary's increasing workload, it is highly
probable that such proposals would generate additional weighty prob-
lems while purporting to solve others. The question posed by the
Arizona court in Roofing Wholesale was answered when the Supreme
Court announced: "The constitution of the United States is the su-
preme law of the land, and binds every forum, whether it derives its
authority from a State or from the United States."' 4 8 This principle
must remain intact, whether announced by the full Court or by the
majority of a bare quorum.
THOMAS M. BURKE
148. Cook v. Moffat, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 295, 308 (1847).
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